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Abstract
Institutions such as hospitals and nursing or long-stay residential homes
accommodate individuals at considerable risk of mortality should they
acquire SARS-CoV-2 infection. In these settings, polymerase chain
reaction tests play a central role in infection prevention and control. Here,
we argue that both false negative and false positive tests are possible and
that careful consideration of the prior probability of infection and of test
characteristics are needed to prevent harm. We outline evidence
suggesting that regular systematic testing of asymptomatic and
pre-symptomatic individuals could play an important role in reducing
transmission of SARS-CoV-2 within institutions. We discuss how such a
programme might be organised, arguing that frequent testing and rapid
reporting of results are particularly important. We highlight studies
demonstrating that polymerase chain reaction testing of pooled samples
can be undertaken with acceptable loss of sensitivity, and advocate such
an approach where test capacity is limited. We provide an approach to
calculating the most efficient pool size. Given the current limitations of tests
for SARS-CoV-2 infection, physical distancing and meticulous infection
prevention and control will remain essential in institutions caring for
vulnerable people.
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Introduction
Whilst there are significant limitations to the prognostic models 
that have been published to date1, the association between older 
age and death in SARS-CoV-2 infection is both clear and 
striking – the infection fatality rate for people in their 80’s has 
been estimated at 7.8%2. Infection prevention and control (IPC) is 
therefore crucial within institutions that bring together many such 
individuals, such as hospitals and nursing or long-stay residential 
homes.
Here we discuss the use of polymerase chain reaction (PCR) 
tests within institutions caring for vulnerable individuals. We 
emphasise that consideration of test characteristics and the prior 
probability of SARS-CoV-2 infection is essential in making 
safe decisions based on PCR results. For example, decisions 
regarding the allocation of side rooms, whether patients can be 
cohorted in COVID or non-COVID spaces, and whether staff 
should be at work. We discuss the different uses of PCR tests, 
and consider which testing strategies should be prioritised. We 
explore how pooling samples prior to testing can result in a more 
efficient use of test capacity, and provide an optimised approach 
to selecting the number of samples to pool. Finally, we suggest 
how staff testing programmes for institutional care settings might 
be efficiently organised. We do not discuss disease surveillance 
or the role of testing for disease control in the wider community, 
but would point readers to recent modelling studies3,4. We only 
briefly discuss serological tests, as these are not yet in routine 
use. Our intended audience are those designing testing strategies 
in health and social care settings, as well as individuals in these 
settings acting on test results.
Epidemiology and importance of transmission 
dynamics for institutional care settings
High rates of SARS-CoV-2 infection with consequent morbidity 
and mortality have been observed in healthcare facilities and 
social care settings. Two infection prevalence surveys conducted 
in April and May 2020 in England found 1.33% and 1.73% of 
people working in ‘patient-facing healthcare or resident-facing 
social care roles’ had positive SARS-CoV-2 PCRs as compared 
with 0.22% and 0.38% of people not working in such roles5,6. 
Over much of this period, health and social care workers were 
one of the few groups permitted to leave their homes to work.
A transmission model parameterised to a typical hospital in the 
United Kingdom suggests that up to 20% of infections in patients 
and 89% of infections in healthcare workers may be a result of 
nosocomial transmission7. Consistent with that, SARS-CoV-2 
infections in healthcare workers and staff have been observed 
to cluster on particular hospital wards8 and a large proportion 
of hospital staff working in particularly exposed roles, such as 
housekeepers (34.5%) and those working in acute medicine 
(33.3%), show serological evidence of having been infected 
during the initial weeks of the pandemic9.
Large transmission clusters of SARS-CoV-2 infections have been 
seen in hospitals and elderly care facilities, along with worker 
dormitories and ships10. In one detailed case report incorporat-
ing phylogenetic analysis, a single introduction of SARS-CoV-2 
into a private hospital in South Africa led to 80 staff members 
and 39 patients becoming infected, with 15 patient deaths11. 
The consequences of transmission within the social care sector 
have, perhaps, been even more severe. In one well-described 
outbreak in a ‘skilled nursing facility’, 57/89 (64%) of resi-
dents were infected, of whom fifteen died; a case fatality rate of 
26%12. Viral sequence data were consistent with two separate 
introductions of SARS-CoV-2 into the facility12.
A key feature of the epidemiology of SARS-CoV-2 transmission 
is that viral shedding begins 2–3 days prior to symptom onset13. 
A high proportion of transmission is thought to occur prior to 
symptom onset, estimated at 40–50% in studies from different 
settings13–16. Disease control strategies that rely on isolation once 
symptoms develop are, therefore, unlikely to be sufficient17.
Whilst a majority of those with SARS-CoV-2 infection do 
eventually develop symptoms, an appreciable prevalence of 
asymptomatic – rather than pre-symptomatic – infection has been 
described in hospital patients (12.4%)18, nursing home residents 
(3.9%)12 and healthcare workers (0.5%)8. The contribution that 
these individuals make to transmission is less clear. The absence 
of cough and coryza might limit infectivity. Alternatively, a 
period of viral shedding without the social distancing and 
reductions in numbers of close contacts, which would have 
otherwise been prompted by symptom onset, might result in 
a greater number of secondary infections. Data suggest that 
pre-symptomatic transmission probably plays a more important 
role than asymptomatic transmission16. However, until this is 
better understood it would be prudent to consider both 
asymptomatic and pre-symptomatic people with positive SARS-
CoV-2 PCRs infectious, particularly given this group are initially 
clinically indistinguishable.
Clearly, the prevalence or prior probability of SARS-CoV-2 
infection, among both individuals with and without symptoms, 
will vary over the course of the pandemic19 and with changes in 
control strategies.
Test characteristics
Viral load in the upper airway, the site most readily sampled, 
is thought to peak around the time of symptom onset13 and to 
be correlated with symptom severity20. An early analysis 
suggested that the sensitivity of PCR-based tests decreases with 
time since symptom onset, with only 67% of nasal and 47% 
of throat specimens expected to be PCR positive ten days after 
symptom onset21. In a small series of well-characterised 
patients with mild disease, test sensitivity was reported to be 
only 40% five days after symptom onset22. Later analysis, 
incorporating some of the same data, estimated that the sensitivity 
of the test was 62% on the day of symptom onset, 80% on 
day three after symptom onset, then declining to 33% by day 16 
post symptom onset23. The sensitivity of a SARS-CoV-2 PCR 
on the day prior to symptom onset was estimated to be between 
6% and 73%, with the imprecision in the estimate reflecting 
the limited data available on pre-symptomatic patients23. Most 
of these studies did serial testing and required at least one 
positive PCR to consider a case confirmed – as a result they 
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may have overestimated the sensitivity of the test. Some of the 
studies included in Kucirka et al.23 allowed probable cases, 
defined on clinical grounds, with a majority of these probable 
cases also having IgM or IgG antibodies against SARS-CoV-2.
Data on test specificity is less readily available. As well as 
the inherent performance of the test, specificity can be impacted 
by: clinicians swabbing the wrong patient or placing the wrong 
sticker on the specimen; RNA contamination at any stage in the 
process; and transcription errors when reporting the result. The 
extent to which these errors occur will be context specific and 
dependent on how robust local procedures are. Importantly, 
PCR based testing only gives a snapshot at one point in time. 
Individuals early in their infection may test negative then positive 
a few hours later23. As with all PCR based tests, poor sampling 
may result in false negatives.
Readily available formulae24 enable the probability of both 
false negative and false positive tests to be estimated under a 
range of assumptions about sensitivity, specificity, and the 
prevalence of the condition in the population being tested.
Testing symptomatic staff in institutional care 
settings
A major concern during the COVID-19 pandemic has been 
health systems’ ability to cope with large numbers of acutely 
unwell individuals presenting to health facilities within a short 
period of time, overwhelming capacity. The availability of skilled 
clinicians is a major constraint on health system capacity and 
high rates of absenteeism have been reported at many centres25. 
Absent staff were either symptomatic, self isolating because a 
household contact was symptomatic, or not working as a result 
of medical conditions that would put them at risk of severe 
disease were they to acquire SARS-CoV-2. There has, thus, 
been great interest in SARS-CoV-2 PCR tests for symptomatic 
health and social care workers and their symptomatic household 
contacts. 
Whilst reducing absenteeism is clearly important, a key concern 
when testing symptomatic individuals is ensuring that false 
negative results don’t result in avoidable transmission of the 
virus among keyworkers and the vulnerable individuals they 
work with. Estimated false negative rates, under a range of 
plausible assumptions, are presented in Table 1.
As others have also noted21,23,26 high rates of false negative tests 
are seen when the prevalence of infection is high, and when 
the sensitivity of the test is low. The proportion of health and 
social care workers who have positive test results should be 
monitored with these data, ideally, disaggregated by symptoms. 
Where this proportion is high, there will be an unacceptable 
false negative rate and institutions should consider asking 
symptomatic staff to self isolate regardless of their test result. 
Examples of such risk stratification have been published8 but, in 
our view, should be kept under review, given the false negative 
rate will vary with the prevalence of infection in the population. 
It may be prudent to only test key workers shortly after symptom 
onset, when the sensitivity of the test is highest.
It is biologically plausible that staff with SARS-CoV-2 infection 
may be less infectious if they have a negative PCR. We know of 
no good data to support such an assertion and would urge 
caution, as negative results can be a result of poor sampling or 
virus being less readily detected in the upper respiratory tract 
than in samples taken from the lower airways27.
As others have also argued3, we feel it likely that any gains in 
terms of reduced absenteeism as a result of a programme of 
testing symptomatic staff may be modest. Staff with symptoms 
may be too unwell to work and, regardless, should not be working 
whilst symptomatic given other respiratory viruses can also be 
transmitted to patients. Testing symptomatic household contacts 
may be more impactful with, potentially, a lower pre-test 
probability, allowing greater confidence in a negative result3.
Testing asymptomatic staff
Arguably, a better use of tests, particularly if capacity is limited, 
would be systematic regular testing of asymptomatic staff, to 
drive down the prevalence of asymptomatic and pre-symptomatic 
infection within institutions caring for the vulnerable. One model 
suggests that weekly PCR testing of asymptomatic health and 
social care workers could reduce their contribution to incident 
infections by 25–33%, over and above any reductions as a result 
of them self-isolating at onset of symptoms3. Given virus is 
likely only detectable 1–2 days prior to symptom onset13,23, one 
might expect more frequent testing to result in greater declines in 
transmission, particularly if results could be fed back promptly. 
A second model gave similar results regards the impact of 
weekly testing and suggested that daily testing of hospital staff 
could reduce healthcare worker to healthcare worker transmission 
by 65% and healthcare worker to patient transmission by 14%7.
Whilst, initially, a programme of testing asymptomatic staff 
might result in additional absenteeism, reductions in transmission 
may result in a favourable impact on staffing levels in the longer 
term7. False positive tests would cause unnecessary absence from 
work, but no direct harm to vulnerable individuals.
The main barrier to regular asymptomatic testing is test 
capacity. For example, there are 1.5 million people working in 
Table 1. Estimated probability of a false negative 
SARS-CoV-2 PCR test under various assumptions 
about the true prevalence of infection and the 
sensitivity of the test24. All estimates assume a test 
specificity of 99.5%.
True 
prevalence 
of infection
Probability of SARS-CoV-2 infection, 
given negative PCR test
95% test 
sensitivity
70% test 
sensitivity
40% test 
sensitivity
90% 31% 73% 84%
30% 2.1% 11% 21%
5% 0.26% 1.6% 3.1%
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adult social care in England28. Pooling samples prior to testing 
could make regular systematic large scale testing of key workers 
feasible. This is discussed in detail below.
The impact of asymptomatic staff testing could be increased by 
calibrating test frequency to the proportion of staff and patients 
testing positive and by offering enhanced support with other 
aspects of IPC to facilities with higher than expected rates of 
positive tests – this approach has been described in the hospital 
setting8.
Testing asymptomatic patients
Following reports of high rates of asymptomatic infection in 
patients presenting to hospital with other issues18, many hospitals 
are now undertaking SARS-CoV-2 PCR tests on all new 
admissions, with the result used to distribute patients to ‘COVID 
areas’, ‘non COVID areas’ or side rooms. With potential for 
harm should people with SARS-CoV-2 infection and vulnerable 
people who have not yet been infected be placed in the same 
space, it is important to think critically about the positive and 
negative predictive value of the test in specific circumstances.
People with a positive PCR result and symptoms consistent 
with COVID-19, as well as asymptomatic individuals with a 
negative PCR test, pose fewer challenges when drafting infection 
control guidelines. Note, however, that the latter group may 
subsequently become PCR positive, either a result of nosocomial 
infection or because they were in their incubation period and 
PCR negative at presentation.
People with COVID-19 symptoms, or imaging and blood tests 
consistent with COVID, but a negative SARS-CoV-2 PCR are 
commonly seen in clinical practice29. Sometimes repeat PCR 
testing, particularly if a sample from the lower respiratory tract 
can be obtained, can confirm the diagnosis. Efforts should also 
be made to exclude alternative diagnoses, such as Pneumocystis 
jirovecii pneumonia, which can present in a similar manner.
The opposite phenomenon – a positive SARS-CoV-2 PCR in an 
asymptomatic person – can also occur. However, the possibil-
ity of this being an erroneous result is less well appreciated. In 
Table 2, are the probabilities of SARS-CoV-2 infection given a 
positive PCR that might be expected under various scenarios. 
False positive results will commonly be seen, particularly in 
settings and populations where the prevalence of infection is low.
Ideally, individuals with PCR test results that are not concordant 
with their symptoms would be cared for in side rooms. However, 
many institutions have a limited number of side rooms, meaning 
such a policy may not be sustainable. Requiring a second positive 
test in asymptomatic people with an initial positive PCR would 
seem prudent before moving them into a ‘COVID area’.
Where individuals’ infection status cannot be resolved and 
side rooms are not available, every effort should be taken to 
avoid placing individuals who would be particularly at risk of 
severe disease should they newly acquire infection in a space 
with individuals who may be infectious. Such a triage approach 
has been piloted at one hospital – in this case with the triage 
decision taken prior to the PCR result being available29. The 
performance of any such algorithm will vary with the background 
prevalence of SARS-CoV-2 infection. If vulnerable and 
potentially uninfected individuals must be moved out of side 
rooms, impeccable infection control measures should be adopted 
in the spaces to which they are moved, perhaps supported by 
better staff-to-client ratios. If possible, such spaces should be 
closed to new admissions to prevent these individuals being 
exposed to new people who may be infectious.
Pooling specimens prior to analysis
One way that testing capacity might be expanded is by pooling 
specimens prior to analysis. A recent report suggests that pooling 
of samples either prior to or following RNA extraction can 
allow multiple samples to be tested in a single PCR reaction 
without significant loss of sensitivity30.
The authors reported a 1.24 increase in the PCR cycle threshold 
with every two-fold dilution of the sample – i.e. going from 
one to two, or two to four samples. In their hands, pooling 
32 samples following RNA extraction reduced the sensitivity 
of the test by 10%. They suggest that some of this loss of 
sensitivity might be overcome by running the PCR for a few 
additional cycles. Any loss of specificity as a result of additional 
PCR cycles would not be expected to impact patient management, 
as individual samples from pools that tested positive would 
then be retested using one PCR reaction per sample.
The probability that, in any pool of specimens, at least one 
will test positive is one minus the probability that all will test 
negative. Here, the prevalence is the prevalence of positive tests, 
were each to be tested in a separate PCR run, rather than the true 
prevalence of infection.
   Probability ≥1 positive = 1 – (1 – prevalence) ^ number of tests
The expected number of pools that test positive would be the 
product of this probability, the number of pools, and the 
sensitivity of the pooled approach, as compared with one PCR 
per sample. The number of infections missed, as compared 
with a one PCR reaction per sample strategy, would approximate 
Table 2. Estimated probability of SARS-CoV-2 infection 
given a positive PCR under various assumptions about 
the true prevalence of infection and the sensitivity of the 
test24. All estimates assume a test specificity of 99.5%.
True 
prevalence of 
infection
Probability of SARS-CoV-2 infection, 
given positive PCR test
95% test 
sensitivity
70% test 
sensitivity
40% test 
sensitivity
15% 97% 96% 93%
5% 91% 88% 81%
1% 66% 59% 45%
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the product of the true prevalence of infection, the loss of 
sensitivity as compared with a one PCR reaction per sample 
strategy, and the number of individuals tested.
The most efficient pool size depends on the prevalence 
(Figure 1). The scenario illustrated in this figure assumes a health 
or social care workforce of 10,000 individuals and the number 
of PCR reactions calculated assumes individual PCRs are then 
performed on each sample in pools that test positive. Again, 
prevalence is the prevalence of positive tests, were each to be 
tested in a separate PCR run, rather than the true prevalence of 
infection.
The most efficient pool size is readily calculable, and the 
prevalence of positive tests should be monitored to ensure the 
optimal pool size is being used. At higher prevalence, larger 
pools are less efficient, as the high proportion of pools testing 
positive limits the number of tests saved.
Box 1. Template staff testing strategy for institutions caring for 
vulnerable people
-   Briefing for staff on the planned testing strategy
-   Sampling frame drawn up for each ward/facility, to include all 
medical, nursing, allied health professionals, and domestic 
staff with a regular presence in the institution
-   Collect mobile phone numbers for each staff member, and 
issue each with a patient number, if they do not already have 
one
-   Collate rotas and prepare two swabs for each staff member 
per week, pre-labelled and in lysis buffer (likely to equate to 
approximately alternate day testing, assuming some rest days)
-   Allocate these to packets that are delivered to wards/facilities 
ahead of time with one packet for each morning handover
-   After morning handover, self nose and throat swabs by 
outgoing night staff and incoming day staff
-   Testing register to include space to note whether any staff 
have left or joined – swabs for new staff could be added to 
subsequent test packets
-   Specimens collected after handover to allow RT-PCR for SARS-
CoV-2 on a mid morning PCR run – this may need a dedicated 
courier collection
-   Positive results called out before 5pm, to ensure incoming 
night staff don’t come on shift (if unable to contact staff 
member, message to be left with nurse in charge)
-   Individual letters, emails or text messages to each staff 
member, containing test results, plus reliable and timely 
communication of positive results to local infection control and 
health protection teams
-   Clear messaging to ensure symptomatic staff do not wait 
for their test result before leaving work, and that individuals 
developing symptoms self isolate regardless of whether they 
have had a recent negative test
-   Dedicated mobile phone and email address for any queries
Organisational considerations for asymptomatic staff 
testing
In designing a testing strategy for asymptomatic staff, there 
will be trade offs. For example, between a one PCR reaction 
per sample strategy and a pooled testing strategy. The former 
would be expected to result in the fastest results if there was 
plenty of capacity, whereas the latter would make most efficient 
use of limited capacity but add a few hours to the turn around 
time.
Duration of infectiousness prior to symptom onset is thought to 
be between 2–3 days13 with limited PCR sensitivity expected 
more than two days prior to symptom onset23. We would, 
therefore, advocate an asymptomatic staff testing strategy that 
prioritises frequent testing and prompt reporting of results over 
marginal improvements in test sensitivity.
Having nose and throat swabs taken by individuals trained to 
do this might result in better sampling, increasing test sensitivity, 
but would place limits on how quickly testing could be scaled 
up. Of note, 1533 swabs taken by symptomatic staff at a hospital 
in England were all positive for RNAaseP, a human nucleic 
acid used as a sample quality control. This does not mean that 
sampling was perfect, but suggests that the swabs did all make 
contact with some human mucosa31. In a smaller study, good 
agreement was seen between PCR results using self swabs and 
swabs taken by a trained professional32.
There is some data to suggest that saliva may represent a viable 
alternative upper respiratory tract sample to nose and throat 
swabs for SARS-CoV-2 PCR. Of the two studies published to 
date, one found saliva had slightly better sensitivity than nose 
and throat swabs33, and one found the opposite34. As one might 
expect, given saliva samples are easier to collect, greater 
consistency was seen between PCR results on repeat saliva 
samples than with repeat nose and throat swabs33. Where self- 
sampling is planned, laboratories may wish to validate PCR assays 
using saliva.
A suggestion as to how a mass testing strategy for staff might 
be organised is outlined in Box 1. Other choices may be more 
appropriate, depending on local circumstances. For example, 
care homes may wish to include regular visitors in their sampling 
frame and to mandate a recent negative PCR prior to visiting. 
Facilities using agency staff may wish to mandate a recent 
negative PCR prior to any shifts. Testing intensity could be 
calibrated to local epidemiology and testing capacity8, with a 
move to daily testing when capacity is available or if high rates 
of asymptomatic infection or disease are seen within facilities. 
Testing programmes should be developed in close collaboration 
with clinicians, infection control teams, health protection teams 
and the workers that are to be tested. 
Duration of self-isolation should be compliant with local 
guidelines, which are likely to evolve as our understanding of 
duration of infectiousness changes. Unless staff are immunocom-
promised, mandating negative PCRs before return to work would, 
in our view, be over cautious given PCR tests may detect non 
viable virus. Immunocompromised people should probably not 
be undertaking patient facing duties currently. In the absence of 
good data on duration of immunity following natural infection, 
pragmatic decisions may need to be taken locally about whether 
Box 1. 
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Figure 1. Number of PCR tests required as a function of pool size at different prevalences in a hypothetical population of 10,000 
individuals.
individuals who have had a positive SARS-CoV-2 PCR continue 
to be included in asymptomatic staff testing programmes.
Serological tests
If and when we develop an understanding of the immunological 
correlates of protection against SARS-CoV-2 infection and or 
COVID-19, and have validated assays to measure this, they 
may compliment PCR based testing. For example, if we had a 
serological assay that could identify individuals with protective 
immunity to infection or disease, positive serology could allow 
someone to be safely moved out of a side room and into a ‘COVID 
area’. Such a test could also identify individuals that would no 
longer need to be included in asymptomatic staff testing 
programmes. For both of these purposes, a highly specific test 
would be needed.
Key messages
•     Correct interpretation of SARS-CoV-2 PCR tests depends 
on the sensitivity of the test and prevalence of infection in 
the population being tested.
•     Test sensitivity declines with time since onset of 
symptoms.
•     The prevalence of infection will vary between groups, 
with the symptoms people report, and over the course of 
the pandemic – monitoring the proportion of PCR tests that 
are positive can give an estimate of the prior probability of 
a positive test.
•     Where prevalence of infection is high, or more than three 
days have elapsed since symptom onset, a negative PCR 
may not reliably exclude SARS-CoV-2 infection and, 
in this situation, symptomatic individuals should isolate 
whatever their PCR result.
•     Where the prevalence of infection is low, false positive 
PCR tests may be commonly seen – it is prudent to obtain 
a second positive test before placing vulnerable individu-
als with a single positive test in a space containing other 
people with SARS-CoV-2 infection.
Page 7 of 10
F1000Research 2020, 9:671 Last updated: 20 JUL 2020
•     Using test capacity to reduce the prevalence of 
SARS-CoV-2 infection in institutions accommodating 
vulnerable individual should be a priority, with models 
predicting a substantial impact on transmission.
•     A significant proportion of SARS-CoV-2 transmission 
occurs prior to symptom onset and there is a window 
of 1–2 days prior to symptom onset when a PCR test 
might be positive – regular testing of asymptomatic 
individuals and the prompt reporting of results are therefore 
needed.
•     Test capacity can be substantially increased by pooling 
samples prior to testing – the most efficient pool size 
will depend on the prevalence of infection and is readily 
calculated.
•     Physical distancing and meticulous infection prevention 
and control will remain essential in institutions caring for 
vulnerable people. 
Data availability
No data are associated with this article.
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